Musical Presence: Towards a New Philosophy of Music by Ford, Charles
Contemporary Aesthetics
Volume 8 (2010)
2010
Musical Presence: Towards a New Philosophy of
Music
Charles Ford
University of London, cc_ford@live.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.risd.edu/
liberalarts_contempaesthetics
Part of the Esthetics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Liberal Arts Division at DigitalCommons@RISD. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Contemporary Aesthetics by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@RISD. For more information, please contact mpompeli@risd.edu.
About CA
Journal
Contact CA
Links
Submissions
Search Journal
 
Editorial Board
Permission to Reprint
Privacy
Site Map
Publisher
Webmaster
Musical Presence: Towards a New Philosophy of Music
  Charles Ford 
Abstract
Most recent writings about the philosophy of music have taken
an analytic or linguistic approach, focusing on terms such as
meaning, metaphor, emotions and expression, invariably from
the perspective of the individual listener or composer. This
essay seeks to develop an alternative, phenomenological
framework for thinking about music by avoiding these terms,
and by extrapolating from the writings of Hegel, Husserl, and
Heidegger. On the basis of discussions of musical time, its
multiple levels of matter, and its internal dialectics, the essay
presents a particular understanding of “style” as the primary
basis for mediation between production and reception. It
concludes that music is no more or less than itself; and that it
comes into presence and resounds within a nonconceptual and
collective socio-historical world, thereby dissolving all
distinctions between feelings and ideas, and fears and desires.
Key Words
Hegel, Heidegger, Husserl, music, nonconceptual, philosophy,
style, truth
1. Introduction
Most recent writings about the philosophy or aesthetics of
music have taken an analytic or linguistic approach, focusing
on terms such as meaning, metaphor, emotions and
expression, invariably from the perspective of the individual
listener or composer.[1]  This essay seeks to develop an
alternative framework for thinking about music by avoiding
these terms altogether, and by extrapolating from the writings
of three German philosophers. Hegel’s phenomenology of
music in Part II of his Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art
(1842)[2] is my starting point; Husserl’s Phenomenology of 
Internal Time Consciousness (1905)[3] provides the basis for
my thinking about musical time; and three works by Martin
Heidegger, Being and Time (1926),[4] “The Essence of Truth”
(1930)[5] and “The Origin of the Work of Art” (1935-1936)[6]
inform my understanding of “musical matter” and the
“nonconceptual,” though nonetheless historical, nature of
music and its experience. My interest in music’s place in the
realm of the nonconceptual, combined with a grounding in
analytic and historical musicology, takes the discussion away
from the customary aesthetic concerns mentioned above and
tends more towards collectivist rather than individualist, and
materialist rather than idealist ways of thinking about music
and its experience. There is one caveat: I am concerned only
with Western classical, jazz, folk and popular music in this
essay.
2. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Music
Hegel’s phenomenology of music brings together music and
listeners into a unity, whilst at once preserving their respective
identities. In other words, he did not subsume one term,
music or the listening subject, under the other, after the
fashion of formalism and relativism, respectively. So despite
Hegel’s central concern with subjective responses to music, he
never lost touch with musical particulars. Indeed, about half of
the section given over to music in his Aesthetics concerns
rhythm, harmony and melody.
Hegel recognised music’s ephemeral temporal and sonic
nature. Moreover, he used music to advance a new theory of
time, as did Edmund Husserl (1905)[7] and Henri Bergson
(1910),[8] again from phenomenological perspectives, about
seventy years later. Hegel proposed that music, because of its
temporal nature, does not stand over and against us as
something concrete and fundamentally other, like a statue,
painting, novel or poem. Rather, music is ephemeral, and so
“volatilizes its real or objective existence into an immediate
temporal disappearance.”[9] Because this idea is fundamental
to Hegel’s phenomenology of music, it is important to take
particular care with two issues that arise from it.
First, the objectivity of the statue, or indeed anything else,
whether an art-work or not, was not left unquestioned by
Hegel. For him, perception is not simply given. Rather, it is a
dialectical unity, insofar as consciousness “finds itself” in its
objects, whilst at once “cancelling” that objectivity in the act of
returning to the self with a concept or subjective
representation of that object. In so doing, we find ourselves,
or become self-conscious, amidst the objective world.
Nonetheless, the “thing in itself” still remains “out there,”
persisting in this, its irreducible, ontological otherness. In both
this, the fundamental otherness of the objective world, as well
as that world’s absorption into consciousness as a concept,
Hegel understood the subject and its object to be in a
dialectical unity, whilst nonetheless standing apart from one
another. As T. M. Knox, in his Preface to the Aesthetics, put it:
… self-consciousness knows no distinction between the
knower and the known, but consciousness of all else
depends on reflexivity, which is to say that
consciousness becomes aware of itself by being aware
of objects and then by being reflected back into itself
from them. Hegel is fond of this metaphor. The eye
does not see itself except through its reflection in a
mirror.[10]
The second reason for taking care with Hegel’s suggestion that
music “volatilizes its real or objective existence into an
immediate temporal disappearance” is because this idea seems
to deny music any objective status. But this is not the case.
Hegel recognised the systematic nature of music.
… the note is not a merely vague rustling and
sounding but can only have any musical worth on
the strength of its definiteness and consequent
purity. Therefore, owing to this definiteness in its
real sound and its temporal duration, it is in
direct connection with other notes. Indeed it is
this relation alone which imparts to it its own
proper and actual definiteness and, along with
that, its difference from other notes whether in
opposition to them or in harmony with them.[11]
Music constantly passes away in time. But this, music’s
essentially ephemeral nature, does not mean that it is any less
objective than anything else.
Having presented these two caveats, I return to Hegel’s idea
that music comes into presence, not as an object standing
apart from ourselves, but by way of absorption “into an
immediate temporal disappearance,” because of its ephemeral
nature. Music’s realm, therefore, is not that of reason but that
which Hegel called the “inner world of feeling.” Feelings do not
find themselves in objects, as does self-consciousness.  Hegel
compared “self-conscious thinking” with feelings. In the
former,
… there is a necessary distinction between (a) the self
that sees, has ideas, and thinks, and (b) the object of
sight, ideas, and thought. But, in feeling, this distinction
is expunged, or rather is not yet explicit, since there the
thing felt is interwoven with the inner feeling as such,
without any separation between them.[12]
On the other hand, the inner world of feeling is entirely self-
contained as a negative subjective unity.
The inner life in virtue of its subjective unity is the
active negation of accidental juxtaposition in space, and
therefore a negative unity. But at first this self-identity
remains wholly abstract and empty and it consists only
in making itself its object and yet in cancelling this
objectivity (itself only ideal and identical with what the
self is) in order to make itself in this way a subjective
unity.[13]
When Hegel wrote that feelings are only “abstract and empty
at first,” he intended “at first” to mean “before,” in a logical
rather than temporal sense, those feelings are taken up with
anything “external,” such as music. Music is absorbed into this
inner world of feelings, and in so doing shapes those feelings.
… what alone is fitted for expression in music is the
object-free inner life, abstract subjectivity as such. This
is our entirely empty self, the self without any further
content. Consequently the chief task of music consists in
making resound, not the objective world itself, but, on
the contrary, the manner in which the inmost self is
moved to the depths of its personality and conscious
soul.[14]
Hegel thought that music lends substance to the inner world of
the feelings because of its similarly ephemeral nature as “mere
vibrations” that constantly die away in time.
Before addressing the temporal nature of music, consider how
Hegel thought that the self interrelates with time, even to the
extent that “time is the being of the subject himself.”[15] The
cyclical nature of self-consciousness, the dialectic by which it
projects itself as an object and then cancels that objectified
self by returning to the “subjective self,” is in continuous
temporal flux. In this movement, self-consciousness breaks up
the undifferentiated continuum of “external” time into
differences, spans of time or temporal fields, in accordance
with its cyclical nature.
[This] implies an interruption of the purely indefinite
process of changes … because the coming to be and
passing away, the vanishing and renewal of points of
time, was nothing but an entirely formal transition
beyond this “now” to another “now” of the same kind,
and therefore only an uninterrupted movement forward.
Contrasted with this empty progress, the self is what
persists in and by itself, and its self-concentration
interrupts the indefinite series of points of time and
makes gaps in their abstract continuity; and in its
awareness of its discrete experiences, the self recalls
itself and finds itself again and thus is freed from mere
self-externalization and change.[16]
It is important to recognise that music is not in time, and
neither does it move through time, for this would be to
suggest that time is something external or logically prior to it.
Musical time is how time is for music and its listeners. Music
forms phenomenological time. I will explain this further in the
next section in relation to Husserl’s theory of time.
Now since time, and not space as such, provides the
essential element in which sound gains existence in
respect of its musical value, and since the time of the
sound is that of the subject too, sound on this principle
penetrates the self, grips it in its simplest being, and by
means of the temporal movement and its rhythm sets
the self in motion.…[17]
I shall return to Hegel’s aesthetics of music at the end of this
essay. Now I go on to present a more detailed conception of
musical time in order to develop his understanding of how self-
consciousness “interrupts the indefinite series of points” of
musical time into spans or fields of presence.
3. Phenomenological Time and Musical Time
Music exists but it does not persist. Music is before all else
ephemeral, constantly passing away from, and thereby
denying, the merely notional points of time that we call “now.”
In Heidegger’s words:
The sequence of “nows” is uninterrupted and has no
gaps. No matter how “far” we proceed in “dividing up”
the “now,” it is always now.[18]
Most of our awareness of time is governed by clocks and
alarms, which register a combination of astronomically and
mechanically determined divisions, as if they were spatial. Yet
when we are alone and relatively passive, perhaps waiting,
travelling, or resting, we turn in on ourselves and into our own
fluid time. Such states of mind are characterized by chronic
distraction:  the endless, uncontrolled droning on of mind’s
“sub-thoughts,” that conceptual part of consciousness that,
insofar as it is more or less beyond our control, is probably
just this side of the subconscious mind. The temporality of this
distracted, “subjective” time is as unintelligible as that of
dreams and under extreme conditions can become
fragmented. Nelson Mandela wrote about the distorted sense
of time experienced by prisoners enduring extended sentences
like his twenty-seven years in prison on Robben Island. His
fellow long-term prisoner, Ahmed Kathedra once said that
… in prison the minutes can seem like years, but the
years go by like minutes. An afternoon pounding rocks
in the courtyard might seem like forever, but suddenly it
is the end of the year, and you do not know where all
the months went.[19]
In such extreme conditions, inner or subjective time becomes
separated from what Husserl called “phenomenological time.”
In his Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness (1905),
Husserl compared this subjective or “immanent” time with an
external or “objective time,” which latter is not available to
consciousness beyond its measurement by clocks.[20]
 Phenomenological time is neither of these but the interface
between changing consciousness and changing reality. As
such, phenomenological time is not a series of discrete
“presents” or “nows” but a continuous flow. What is “now” is
no more than a notional section of that flow: it may refer to a
few seconds or to an era. For instance, I am enjoying a
particularly pleasant day when all at once the quality of the
day as a whole comes to mind in the instant when I think, “Oh
what a wonderful day!” Such moments can take in hours of
experience or even historical epochs. Then again, my
memories, or what Husserl termed “retentions,” might recall
the day as a similar “unity in memory.”[21] Husserl called this
past “gist” of the day as a whole not a simple retention but a
“retention of retention.”[22] This distinction marks up the
difference between a recent memory that constantly merges
with and informs the present – a “retention,” and one that is
cut off and distinct from the present – a “retention of
retention.”
Husserl’s discussion of the time of a melody is couched in
terms of the retentions of the immediate past.[23] Music, he
said, involves a continuous and constant “running off” of
sounds into this past. The content of this running off is implicit
within the musical “now.”[24] So whilst we perceive a melody
note-by-note, we also accumulate what we have already heard
up to the present instant as the “unity in memory” that we
apprehend as the “now.” Meanwhile, what is “now” changes
the character of those retentions that are implicit within that
“now.”
…everything new reacts on the old; its forward-moving
intention is fulfilled and determined thereby, and this
gives the reproduction a definite colouring.[25]
Then that which is “now” itself becomes a retention as it “runs
off” behind, so to speak, some future “now.” What is perceived
to be now is as one with the unperceived past.[26] “Now” is
no more than the leading edge of the past, or the end of what
was. Meanwhile, expectations, like memories, are component
parts of what is now.  Husserl called expectations
“protentions.”  Protentions arise on the basis of what is now.
But, there is no now. Rather what is now is constantly moving
forwards, as fluidly as water.  Because time is, of course,
irreversible, there cannot be a symmetrical relationship
between retentions and protentions, but rather they stand in a
dynamic dialectic. Whereas the protentive aspects of musical
or any other form of phenomenological time involve the
content of its retentions, retentions do not involve the content
of protentions.
Whilst Husserl used the example of a melody to develop his
explanation of phenomenological time, his theory tells us
nothing about musical processes and structures. It does not
explain, for instance, how music defines the duration or extent
of retentions and protentions by means of periods, up-beats
and cadences; or how, at some point during our perception of
a melody, the retentive qualities of the musical “now” are
taken over by protentions, as we begin to sense how far we
are from the end of that protention and the form that end will
take.[27] These changes involve seconds and fractions of
seconds of music. The temporal compression of all the
parameters of music – rhythm, pitch, harmony, timbre,
texture, and dynamics – is astonishing. One minute of music
can seem like fifteen of most other experience.
There is as yet much to be done with the application of
Husserl’s terms to music. Most especially, it could provide the
basis for a new typology of rhythm in terms of passages of
music being more or less protentive or retentive, static or
dynamic.[28] I will return to Husserl’s conception of
phenomenological time towards the end of this essay. Now I
turn to the question of the stuff of music – musical matter.
4. Functional and Artistic Materials
As mentioned at the beginning of this essay, the central
section of Hegel’s chapter on music in his Aesthetics[29]
concerns music’s “sensuous materials.”  But this is little more
than what is now called the “rudiments of music:”  how “triple
time” is notated for instance.  So I turn instead to the way in
which Martin Heidegger conceived of artistic matter generally,
which will then serve as a basis for a discussion of musical
matter in particular. This involves a somewhat lengthy
digression from my concern with music. Please be patient.
Heidegger’s philosophy is particularly promising for music
because one of its principal concerns is with “nonconceptual
consciousness,” meaning that range of experience which is not
linguistic, or which is “unsayable.” This unusual concern arose
from Heidegger’s dissatisfaction with propositional truth, or
what he called the “correspondence theory” of truth. I
approach his insight into the material of art by way of three
stages on which I will base a model of musical matter. It is to
his criticism of this traditional understanding of truth and the
alternative that he presents that I first turn.
In his essay “The Origin of the Work of Art” (1936) Heidegger
continued the discussion of truth that he first developed in
Being and Time (1926) and then again in his essay “The
Essence of Truth” (1930). In the latter, he called the
customary understanding of truth one of “correspondence”
because it concerns the correctness of a concept to a thing.
But, Heidegger asked, how can there be an “inner-possibility
of agreement” between a thing, such as a 10p piece, and a
proposition concerning one? The 10p piece is round and
metallic whereas the proposition, which is said to agree with
it, is linguistic.[30] In order to find a definition of truth that is
rooted in being, rather than in propositions, Heidegger turned
to our immediate, nonconceptual experience of things, though
not to “mere things,” which he referred to as “self-refusing” or
unknowable, but to tools and equipment generally. Heidegger’s
thinking about equipment is the object of the next, second
stage of this discussion of functional and artistic matter.
In Being and Time Heidegger pointed out that, because we are
so preoccupied with instrumental attitudes, much of our
awareness of things is in terms of their functions or use
value.[31] Just as the sign always draws our attention away
from itself, so too does the tool. Both sign and tool are
encountered as being “ready-to-hand,” or in the English
vernacular as being “handy,” rather than “present-at-hand,” or
again in everyday terms as “present.”[32] Tools do not
become present because our concern is not with them but with
the work in hand. Heidegger gave the example of a hammer,
the purpose of which is to bang in nails. We do not encounter
the hammer by thinking about it; we grasp and wield it, for
our concern is not with it but with our reason for using it.[33]
Furthermore, a tool can only be handy when it is manipulated
in accordance with a purpose, or what Heidegger calls an
“assignment” or “in-order-to” to which it refers, as does the
symbol to the sign. Within this “manifold of reference” or
“equipmental world,” tools are manipulated according to the
purpose for which they have been designed. For example, my
hammering has the immediate “in-order-to” of banging in a
nail to secure the side of a desk. I am making a desk in order
to study. The “towards-which” of studying is to write this
essay, and so on. Because the ultimate “towards-which” is
always our individual or collective selves, Heidegger said that
we are always already ahead of ourselves in our concern with
our projects.[34]
However if the hammer breaks and its reliability fails, so too is
its manifold of reference interrupted, and the hammer changes
from being handy to become present.[35] It stands forth as
that which is disrupting my project. But this is only momentary
because the defective equipment immediately becomes
something to be mended, and as such is absorbed back into
its equipmental context or “world.”[36]
In other words, something is revealed to us before we put a
name to it, in this case, “broken.” Here is another example of
this moment of nonconceptual recognition. I am waiting at a
railway station to meet a very good friend called Richard,
whom I have not seen for a decade. A stranger taps me on
the shoulder. I turn, think fleetingly, “Who is this man?  Does
he wish to ask me something about the trains?” Then
gradually his face becomes familiar, as if emerging through the
ageing process. Richard! His name comes after that moment
of revelation. This everyday revelation of the thing in-itself,
the broken hammer or the person in himself, Richard, is, in
Heidegger’s terms, a moment of truth, however fleeting,
however mundane. Thus, by removing all traces of both
correctness and metaphysics from his conception of truth,
Heidegger returned truth to an albeit brief, material, everyday
experience. Now I move on to the third stage of my
understanding of Heidegger’s conception of matter.
Heidegger continued his discussion of tools in his later essay,
“The Origin of the Work of Art” (1936), though now with
respect to the useful materials that are worked on in order to
produce something. Such functional materials, like tools,
disappear in their use. ‘Equipment’ and ‘material’ are
synonymous in the following:
The production of equipment is finished when a material
has been so formed as to be ready for use. For
equipment to be ready means that it is dismissed
beyond itself, to be used up in serviceability.[37]
However, in the artwork the “thingness” of the thing, its
“materiality,” is revealed as being of value in itself, or as
present.[38]  The experience of truth as revelation in art,
unlike that of the broken tool, endures.
To be sure, the sculptor uses stone just as the mason
uses it, in his own way. But he does not use it up. That
happens in a certain way only where the work
miscarries. To be sure, the painter also uses pigment,
but in such a way that colour is not used up but rather
only now comes to shine forth. To be sure, the poet also
uses the word – not, however, like ordinary speakers
and writers who have to use them up, but rather in such
a way that the word only now becomes and remains
truly a word.[39]
5. Musical Matter
Now I am better placed to address the matter of music.
Consider first the distinction between noise and sound. Noises
are dismissed as soon as they are heard because they are
“used up,” rejected out of hand as the unwanted by-product of
some, usually known, activity. Sounds, like noises are always
sounds of something, but are more or less welcome: the
telephone bell, birdsong for instance.
Musical sound stands forth from all other sound as sufficient to
itself. It is immediately distinguishable from sonic matter
generally because notes are far more acoustically focussed
than noise (as can be seen through an oscilloscope). Musical
sound is characterised by an acceptable balance of “overtones”
– a high series of pitches within and above named notes: what
Hegel referred as the musical note’s “definiteness and
consequent purity.”[40] This “harmonic series” defines the
timbre or tone quality of a musical sound. These musical
sounds move and change in accordance with a more or less
steady pulse that, because of its lack of differentiation and
therefore pattern, is not yet rhythmic. I will refer to this barely
musical combination of sound and pulse as primary musical
matter. But primary musical matter is not yet music, for there
are a further two levels of musical matter before it can serve
and be regenerated by musical creativity.
Secondary musical matter arises from the differentiation of
these basic musical sounds. In Western music, secondary
musical matter is grounded in the division of the octave – the
primary overtone of the “harmonic series” – into twelve
discrete and evenly “spaced” pitches, known as the “chromatic
scale.” But these notes do not form a scale as such because
they are evenly spaced and, like a mere pulse, therefore have
no pattern, no beginning or end: they merely start and stop.
At this logical stage, or the next, the pulse of primary musical
matter becomes patterned into metres – ¾, 4/4, etc. – which
produced a regular series of downbeats, i.e. the stressed first
note of each group of three or four.
Tertiary musical matter forms when these evenly spaced series
of notes are divided into unevenly “spaced” scales, which,
being poised between similarity and difference, are thereby
patterned. As a result of this patterning, these scales have a
primary note and chord, towards which all other notes and
chords are directed. Now the primary notes of scales are at
their strongest and clearest when they are underpinned by
metric downbeats. This happens most clearly at cadential
points. The combination of patterned pitches and patterned
rhythms is the tertiary musical matter that is ready to be
formed into music per se.
An illustration may clarify this point. I am driving to a music
festival. As I approach the site I begin to distinguish primary
and secondary musical matter emerging through the traffic
noise in the form of musical notes and a pulse, but as yet I
cannot hear its tertiary musical matter, let alone any music.
Primary, secondary and tertiary musical matter coexist in
pieces of music. In this example, the various levels musical
matter arise successively as I approach the festival site.
Whilst primary and secondary musical matter are pretty well
unchanging, tertiary musical matter has changed through
history. The first known scales were either 5-note pentatonic
or 7-note modal ones – Dorian, Phrygian and so forth – each
having a different ordering of semitone and whole tone
intervals. But the Ionian scale, which forms what we now know
as the major scale, has a far greater sense of linear direction
and gravitation towards the primary note. I will return to this
point later. In the early eighteenth-century, major, along with
the less stable minor mode, scales and harmonies were
organised into a coherent, functional system of tonal relations
known as “the cycle of fifths.” The equivalence of keys in this
cycle arose on the basis of a new system of tuning known as
“equal temperament.”[41] Having been first given voice in the
music of J. S. Bach, this system began to govern all the
internal relationships of almost every piece of Haydn, Mozart
and Beethoven’s music, and continued to hold true throughout
the nineteenth century.
Classical composers in Vienna in the second decade of the
twentieth-century, led by Arnold Schönberg, discarded diatonic
scales and their associated harmonic logic and returned to the
secondary musical matter of the twelve equally spaced
divisions of the octave. Whereas tertiary tonal musical matter
involves a more-or-less strong gravitational pull, by force of
which all pitches are heard as being more-or-less distant from
a tonic, “atonal” melodies constitute free-floating patterns
linked by similarity relations. Schönberg’s new serial method of
composition organised these patterns by way of “pre-
compositional” pitch matrices, which were particular to each
new composition as its unique tertiary musical matter from
which he forged his music. Then, John Cage’s experiments
with recorded ambient sounds rejected even primary musical
matter in favour of found or “ambient” sounds, as if to get
behind or beneath music as previously understood.
Whilst classical music tended towards atonality in the
twentieth century, popular music has preferred modal,
pentatonic and “blues scales” as its tertiary musical matter.
These scales are far less clearly defined from one another than
major and minor ones. For instance, in the Dorian scale on D,
a particular melody can easily make A seem to be the primary
note.[42] Dynamics, apart from detailed accentuation, are far
less important to popular music, most songs remaining at
roughly the same dynamic level throughout. Timbre, on the
other hand, has been vitally important for its development in
the form, for instance, of changing guitar sounds and ways of
producing the voice, sometimes involving pre-primary level or
‘non musical’ sounds known appropriately as “dirt.” Such
fleeting references to sub-musical matter, unlike Cage’s
sustained ones, have played a crucial role in defining changes
of style. Popular music’s rhythmic tertiary musical matter is
also distinct from that of classical music. For instance, Black
US-American popular music and jazz have been characterised
by a play of surface, millisecond differences, sometimes known
by the essentially nonconceptual notion of “feel,” or what I
have elsewhere called “contraflection.”[43] “Feel” involves
miniscule inflections of rhythm, pitch and dynamics in popular
music and jazz most obviously, though also in classical music,
as Eric Clarke’s empirical analyses of classical piano
performances have revealed.[44]
6. Hegel and Heidegger’s Dialectics of Art
So far I have provided an account of musical time and matter.
This alone, for Hegel and all other nineteenth-century
philosophers of art, would have been insufficient to explain
music’s extraordinary power, its transcendence of mere
matter, and quite rightly so. Hegel, and then much later,
Heidegger thought that the matter of art, which they called
“sensuous materials” and “earth” respectively, only took on
the real mantle of art in combination with “ideal thought” for
Hegel or “world” for Heidegger. In this section of my essay I
enquire into these two dialectics on the way to proposing a
different, more material model.
Hegel’s understanding of the nature of art is bound up with his
claims for art’s capacity to reveal truth, which probably
influenced Heidegger’s thinking about truth generally. Hegel
thought that if a work of art is to carry the possibility of truth,
it cannot be reducible to its material or “sensuous” being but
rather “stands in the middle between immediate sensuousness
and ideal thought.”[45] (This conception of “ideal thought”  is
coextensive with Idea, Spirit and the Absolute in the
Aesthetics.[46]) Neither the perceived sensuous materials of
the work of art nor the transcendent, unperceived Idea that it
embodies can take precedence over one another. Both must
be present in a dialectic.[47]
… art’s vocation is to unveil the truth in the form of
sensuous artistic configuration, to set forth the
reconciled opposition just mentioned [between sensuous
material and Ideal thought], and so to have its end and
aim in itself, in this very setting forth and unveiling.[48]
To find an equivalent dialectic in Heidegger, I resume my
earlier discussion of the way that he understood artistic matter
in “The Origin of the Work of Art.” As an example of how the
matter of a work of art is not used up, Heidegger turned to
Van Gogh’s painting of 1887of a pair of peasant’s shoes. In
this essay both mere things and equipment are referred to as
“earth.”
The “self-refusing” materiality of the shoes, by which
Heidegger meant their “unknowability,” can only be brought
forth and revealed with an intensity that is unique to art, or
“be true,” by the way in which the painting evokes the broader
context of the world of the peasant.
Under the soles slides the loneliness of the field-path as
evening falls. In the shoes vibrates the silent call of the
earth, its quiet gift of the ripening grain and its
unexplained self-refusal in the fallow desolation of the
wintry field.[49]
The peasant woman ... has a world because she dwells
in the overtness of beings, of the things that are. Her
equipment, in its reliability, gives to this world a
necessity and nearness of its own.[50]
Heidegger uses the term ‘world’ in this passage in a particular
sense to imply an over-arching context, similar to the artisan’s
“manifold of reference” as discussed above, though much
greater, within which things emerge, or “thing” for artistic
experience.
The world worlds, and is more fully in being than the
tangible and perceptible realm in which we believe
ourselves to be at home. World is never an object that
stands before us and can be seen. World is the ever-
nonobjective to which we are subject …[51]
Heidegger’s idea of the “ever-non objective to which we are all
subject” refers to the fact that this world can never be
predicated, and so can never become objective. It will play an
essential role in this essay because it is to this nonconceptual
world that music belongs.
The work of art combines earth and world, in a similar way to
Hegel’s “sensuous materials” and Idea.
The setting up of a world and the setting forth of earth
are two essential features in the work being of the work.
They belong together, however, in the unity of work
being.[52]
This unity is not an easy one but a continuous striving
between the two terms, not so much against, as between one
another; a striving in which earth and world preserve their
mutual independence and their interdependence.
In essential striving ... the opponents raise each other
into the self-assertion of their natures.[53]
But, whilst Hegel’s general aesthetic theory, as expounded in
his introduction, rests on the dialectic between “sensuous
materials” and Idea, there is no mention of the latter in the
section on music. This can be attributed to his fundamental
identification of music with feelings, which in Hegel’s scheme
have no access to the Ideal. It would seem that this was the
reason why Hegel did not rate music as highly as literature
and art in his hierarchy of the arts. Despite this essential part
of Hegel’s dialectic having been thus denied music, I will
retrieve some of Hegel’s ideas on the subject at the end of this
essay.
There is also a problem for thinking about music in
Heidegger’s “The Origin of the Work of Art.” Despite his
critique of the correspondence theory of truth and his concern
for the nonconceptual, and despite his idea of the stone of the
sculpture and the paint of the painting being brought forth and
held as “earth” in its dialectic with “world,” both “earth” and
“world” are bound up with representation in his discussion of
Van Gogh’s painting. Both the shoes and the peasant’s world
are represented or referred to by the painting after the
manner of concepts. However, Heidegger’s idea of the
preconceptual “world” in “The Origin of the Work of Art” will
prove to be most pertinent at the end of this essay, though I
prefer the term “nonconceptual” because I do not want to
suggest any primacy for either the conceptual or the
nonconceptual worlds.
Both philosophers pointed to a dialectic in works of art
between their perceived matter and something unperceived
that goes beyond that matter and brings that matter into
presence as art. In both cases this unperceived “other
something” is of a completely different order from the matter
of the work of art. Both Hegel’s Idea and Heidegger’s “world”
imply something far greater and more complex than any one
piece of music, something at the level of an era, epoch or
zeitgeist. But this “something other” that lets music come into
presence need not be of a different order from
music.                                                                        
7. Mediation by Style
The combination of primary, secondary and tertiary musical
matter that I advanced earlier is not music per se. Like
Hegel’s “sensuous materials,” tertiary musical matter, such as
scales and metres, require something else to become music. I
propose calling this something “style.” From here on I am
using this word not to mean “fashion” but as a musicological
and philosophical category with a specific meaning. Style is
the system by which musical matter becomes music.[54]
 Style, like “Idea” and “world,” is imperceptible as such.
However, “style,” unlike “Idea,” is “musical” in the sense that
it is a set of musical conventions for organising musical matter
into pieces of music. So this conception of style is a material
rather than a transcendent, metaphysical conception, as is
Hegel’s Idea and Heidegger’s world. Music is brought down to
ground, as it were, by style. Moreover, style is something that
is open to examination and debate. In the following, I discuss
the content of style and what it means for both producers of
music, on the one hand, and for listeners, on the other.
Compare  two styles, both of which arose on the basis of the
same tertiary musical matter of major and minor scales and
harmonies, as well as fixed metres: eighteenth-century
Classical music,[55] and the “bebop” jazz style of the “forties”
and “fifties.” Classical composers wrote high profile melodies
that were usually singable, whilst being at the same time
capable of fragmentation into distinct motives. These melodies
or “themes” have more distinct profiles than other music in
the same pieces that is not so much thematic as
developmental or accompanimental. Most Classical pieces of
music remain in the same metre and are organised
hierarchically into 2-, 4-, 8- and 16-bar periods.  All pieces
were written in accordance with the overall structure and
proportions of more-or-less conventional “sonata forms” with
a more-or-less fixed overall tonal structure. Harmony, which
usually comprised primary triads and dominant sevenths,
changed at various rates according to their place in the overall
structure. Keys were defined by cadences that articulated
important structural divisions. Certain instruments and groups
of instruments were preferred for various genres: quartet,
symphony, concerto etc.
Compare these style markers with those of bebop. This was
nearly always performed in 4- or 5-piece groups, always
including piano, bass, and drums. The musical material was
almost always 12-bar blues and 32-bar ballads. The overall
structure of pieces always took the form of a theme, known as
the “head tune,” followed by a series of improvisations on the
chord sequence of that theme, and its return to close the
piece. Head-tunes are angular, rhythmically uneven, and often
played at high speeds, as were the melodies of improvisations,
which are built up on the basis of rhythmically and melodically
manipulated arpeggios. Bass players played even crotchets
and quavers that clarified the chords. Drummers kept time but
also provided complex, ever-changing rhythms. Pianists
avoided simple triads, preferring stabbed dissonant chords
between beats.
Similar lists of generative characteristics can be drawn up
about any style. Styles are often organised like Russian dolls
within one another. For instance, Robert Johnson’s recordings
of blues in the mid-thirties are in a sub-style of Southern US
acoustic pre-war blues, which is itself a sub-style of the blues
generally, thence of the entire history of Black US-American
popular music, and finally that of recorded popular music as a
whole.
Styles change within themselves and in their relations with
others. These changes are brought about by music produced
within those styles. Some pieces advance styles more than
others. Some reproduce them by reaffirming their secondary
musical materials. Others do not necessarily develop, but at
least play with their style.
Then again, there are those who oppose and even reject a
style: Beethoven’s music is probably the best known Classical
example of opposition. Outright rejection of a style in favour of
a wholly original one is as unlikely as instantaneous revolution.
Whilst Schönberg rejected tonality in favour of serial
procedures, his music nonetheless has a distinctly Viennese
sound, as indeed do Webern’s pointillesque miniatures. Free
improvisation, by definition, rejects all styles, in favour of the
dynamics of the moment.[56] The fact that it attracts such
miniscule audiences proves the point: nearly all listeners need
music to correspond with a style with which they are familiar.
Style pulls itself up by the bootstraps of its own works because
every new piece contributes to the “style bank” on which that
piece and that style depends. Because producers contribute to
styles with every new piece they produce, and because
listeners become increasingly familiar with those styles, they
are dynamic, historical. Styles change within themselves in
accordance with tendencies of their own procedures.  For
instance, eighteenth-century chromatic inflections in the
Classical Style became far-reaching as Romantic composers
sought for originality. In more technical terms, once “leading
notes” took on the possibility of resolution in various keys, the
sure ground of Classical tonality was shaken. On the other
hand, styles can change for contingent reasons. Developments
of electronic dance music in the last twenty years are
attributable to new technology and the growing power of
studio producers and engineers over the musicians they once
served. More generally, broader cultural changes can have an
impact on style change, as did the Viennese Secession provide
fertile cultural ground for Schönberg, and sixties “counter-
culture” for more exploratory popular music.
All musical experience depends on the interweaving of the
style of a particular piece of music and listeners’ familiarity
with that style, which I call “musical competence,” after the
fashion of “linguistic competence.” [57] When a listener does
not have the necessary familiarity, there can be no such
accord. In that case listeners might say, “that’s not music” or
“that sort of music always sounds like that.” In the former
response, perhaps even the tertiary musical matter is not
recognised as such. In the latter, a particular piece sounds
only as an example of an unfamiliar style and consequently
has no particular identity. More generally, in the case of music
that rejects dominant styles, music producers, whether
popular song writers or composers, can intentionally stimulate
collective ruptures between their music and listeners, as is the
case with modernism across the arts and with punk rock in the
late seventies.
Musical competence does not require any ability to
conceptualize music. People often say, as if apologetically, “I
don’t know anything about music.” But there is nothing to
know, in the sense of conceptualize, about music’s
nonconceptual nature. Indeed, freedom from musical
concepts, such as “modulation” and “middle-eight,” can
perhaps enable a “purer,” since nonconceptual, musical
experience. On the other hand, such conceptual “props” can
assist sustained musical attention. It must be emphasised that
conceptual and nonconceptual are not discrete or mutually
opposed realms of consciousness, but always intertwined,
informing one another. A “purely nonconceptual” musical
experience is at least improbable. Nonetheless, musical
competence requires only attentive and repeated listening to
representative pieces in any one style. Every new musical
experience contributes to deepening and broadening listener’s
musical competence.
Because of the shared necessity of style for both musical
production and musical reception, style is the primary form of
mediation between music and listening. Music only exists
insofar as it is the incarnation of a style. Reciprocally, style is
only perceived insofar as it becomes incarnate in pieces of
music. This is unlike the way in which Hegel’s perceived
“sensuous materials” and Heidegger’s perceived “earth” are
opened up by their dialectical union with unperceived “Ideal
thought” and “world” respectively, because now both terms –
piece and style – are essentially musical. There is nothing
transcendent about music. Incredible as it may seem, music is
nothing but itself. This is to affirm, not deny, the “magic of
music.”
The philosophical significance of this conception of style is far-
reaching. Think, for instance, what form Kant’s Critique of
Judgment would have taken if he had presented his notion of
sensus communis in terms of style. I leave this question to
Kant scholars. Meanwhile, I also leave questions of musical
access and distribution, together with listeners’ various and
diverse responses to sociologists of music. I think of these
issues as forms of secondary mediation, in the sense that
musical style as primary mediation logically proceeds them.
[58]
8. Musical Worlds Within Worlds
In this section I consider how music comes into presence
within what we may think of as the world of its style, and then
again within Heidegger’s understanding of “world” as a
nonconceptual historical totality: worlds within worlds.[59] But
first, consider the power and the limits of nonconceptual
experience.
The nonconceptual world is of necessity closed to predication.
As such it is of immense significance. Its power over our lives
is so powerful because we cannot predicate it and are in this
sense directed by it. It is an aspect of collective consciousness
too often neglected because it can have more power over our
lives than conceptual consciousness. (I will return to this point
with respect to popular music.) This world is that of our
desires and our fears and all those perceptions that are
beyond our control: sounds and smells, both of which have
such enormous power to recall our past. It is a world of
vagary, of soft edges and fluidity.[60]
The “conceptual” and “nonconceptual” are far more inclusive
terms than Hegel’s understanding of reason and feeling. Just
as information is conceptual but not the whole of reason, so
too is music nonconceptual but not the whole of feelings.
Concepts and “nonconcepts” are as one within most
experience, and it is only when listening to music in a
completely unfamiliar style that we do not automatically
identify instruments, ways of performing, verses and so forth.
Musical concepts can usually help nonconceptual musical
experience insofar as they can provide toeholds for
concentration. ‘Pure’ nonconceptual listening may give the
most pure and profound musical experience, but it is probably
rare.
How can music be thought to render incarnate in sound, in the
sense of give voice to, not only the world of its style but also
the greater, non-musical, nonconceptual world of which it is a
part? Haydn’s music, on the one hand, and the blues on the
other, provide starkly opposed examples of how music comes
into presence in different relationships with its style, and in
this way brings into presence very different worlds.
Haydn was able to transform mere scraps of the secondary
musical matter of the Classical style into distinctive music. He
manipulated indifferent, anonymous melodic fragments, such
as semitone steps, even repeated notes, so as to become the
essential, idiosyncratic musical germ of a whole movement.
And yet, Haydn also brought forth these fragments for what
they were – mere, tertiary musical matter. Much of the
fascination of his music, and especially its humour, derives
from such annulment of all distinction between the unique and
original on the one hand, and the general and anonymous on
the other; and so much so that the most simple musical sense
perception can stand forth as if by magic. Such
transformational dialectics represented Haydn’s contribution to
the late eighteenth-century European Enlightenment’s
fascination with empiricism and sense perception. Whilst this
fascination was worked through conceptually, it was also a
nonconceptual way of being that lay before, behind, or beyond
the intellectual world. Haydn’s music brings into presence or
“resonates with” first, the world of the Classical style, and
second with the “nonconceptual” totality of the Enlightenment.
On the other hand, a blues of the sort that was recorded in
the 1920s and ‘30s in the US Deep South, and which continues
to be produced today, is a mere strip off the blues. The style’s
riffs, licks and sung phrases were freely plundered and
reordered by individual singers. So rather than resonating with
the valued aesthetic unity and unique originality of Classical
music, a particular blues resounds not its own particular
identity but the blues as an anonymous, collective style-world.
Whereas Haydn’s music develops its style, the blues insists on
it,[61] thereby resounding the seemingly indelible shadow of
absolutely unindividuated slavery that stills hangs over the
ever non-objective nonconceptual world of much of Black US-
America, and still comes into presence through its music.
Whilst we can still hear the resonance of both Haydn’s music
and the “Delta Blues” today, their worlds remain more or less
distant from us. Music can open a door on foreign or past
worlds but, as with all history, what we hear coming through
that door is only what music affords to us from where and
when we are listening.[62]  For this reason, I distinguish 
between resonating and resounding. Whilst music from the
past has the potential to resonate with the nonconceptual
world of its production (within the terms of a particular style),
music of our own time can resound, in the sense of give voice
to, our own world.
Despite this distinction, it is nonetheless worth speculating on
whether music can give more immediate access to past times
than can literature or visual art. Perhaps Haydn’s music can
induce listeners today into the nonconceptual
phenomenological temporality of his time, and thereby (to
some extent) evoke its presence. Certainly, at the level of
individual history, hearing an ambient recording from one’s
distant past – sounds of cars and birds for instance – can
evoke that time far more strongly than diaries.
Resonance is not a necessary part of musical experience. Most
listeners today, whilst they inevitably bring their own personal
and public worlds to their experience of Haydn’s music, will not
be aware of how it once resounded the Enlightenment for the
Enlightenment. But such listeners’ musical experience can be
nonetheless rich without their knowing anything about that
eighteenth-century resonance. However, the way that
contemporary music resounds our own world seems almost
necessary, inevitable.
Nowadays in the West the music that most clearly holds the
promise of resounding our world is contemporary popular
music, and then most especially for teenagers, for whom it is
akin to “the soundtrack of their lives.” But how can popular
music resound anything when, as is so often the case, it is not
actively listened to, but only heard in a distracted manner as
the “handy” background for some other concern?[63]
Because we have no “ear-lids,” and no need to turn towards
the source of sound, we are far more vulnerable to it than we
are to visual perceptions. Sometimes we can feel almost as if
victims of our sonic ambience, which we hear but try not to
listen to. So it is that shoppers, however much they might
hate muzak, still hear it in the supermarket, for if they did not
consume more as a result it would not be there.[64]
Pieces of popular music, whatever their value and however
casually they are listened to, resound their contemporary world
for even the most distracted listeners. Indeed, it could be said
that when popular music is not listened to attentively, and
consequently not controlled by conceptual reason, it can take
on more significance, because it is not fully brought to
consciousness. It is the very distracted or “un-listened” to way
that so much pop is heard that gives it such potency (and
makes it such an ideological danger). Popular music is of the
utmost importance for the formation of teenage identity
because it resounds teenagers’ collective nonconceptual world,
and consequently goes on to become an essential part of our
adult identity. In this sense, we are what we have heard.
9. Musical Presence
Hegel said that music does not present itself as being apart
from the self like an object, but enters into the time of the
negative unity of self-consciousness, shaping it, as it were,
from within. I have quoted the following passage before:
… what alone is fitted for expression in music is the
object-free inner life, abstract subjectivity as such. This
is our entirely empty self, the self without any further
content. Consequently the chief task of music consists in
making resound, not the objective world itself, but, on
the contrary, the manner in which the inmost self is
moved to the depths of its personality and conscious
soul.[65]
Hegel was right to identify music with the object-free realm of
the feelings if  “feelings” are thought to be an ill-defined part
of nonconceptual experience. But musical experience is neither
“inner,” of the “soul” or “spirit,” or absolutely individual.
Rather the reverse, for pieces do not throw listeners into
inwardness, but rather open them out to a nonconceptual
world which, whilst registered individually, is also collective.
So, rather than having individual control over music, we offer
ourselves up to musical experience within the freedom of a
collective style. This idea is in accord with Kant’s grounding of
aesthetic judgement in universal subjective validity,[66]
though, and this is most important, with “universal”
substituted by “collective historical.”
This, the anonymous, collective nature of music has been
registered by musicians. Composers and songwriters have
often affirmed the embedding of their music in the realm of
the nonconceptual and unintended. Elgar said of his
composition:
It is my idea that music is in the air all around us, the
world is full of it, and at any given time you simply take
as much of it as you require.[67]
Elgar had that rare and peculiar capacity to be able to
resound, so beautifully, his world of Edwardian nostalgia. Early
in his career, Bob Dylan, who similarly ‘gave voice to’  the
prophetic teenage nonconceptual rumblings of the late 50s and
early 60s, often made a similar point about song writing to
Elgar’s about composition:
The song was there before me, before I came along. I
just sort of came down and just sort of took it down
with a pencil, but it was all there before I came
around.[68]
In these two quotations, Elgar and Dylan played down the
individual origins, and in this sense, the “genius” of their work.
Adorno suggested a similar attitude, though now with respect
to listening. He regretted the loss of the age when ..”. the
individual effected his identification with art not by assimilating
the work of art to himself, but by assimilating himself to the
work.”[69] Levinas had a similar idea of listeners giving
themselves over to music, and in a way that is close to
Hegel’s thinking.
Rhythm represents a unique situation where we cannot
speak of consent, assumption, initiative or freedom,
because the subject is caught up and carried away by it.
The subject is part of its representation. It is so not
even despite itself, for in rhythm there is no longer a
oneself, but rather a sort of passage from oneself to
anonymity.[70]
Because of the ephemeral nature of sound, it has only a
transient and insubstantial objectivity. Mere sounds recede and
are absorbed into the preconceptual ambience of the everyday
world. Whilst music is absorbed in this way, it nevertheless
stands forth as music. Music brings sounds into presence in
the most incredibly compressed, complex and detailed
patterns of sound in time, measurable only in milliseconds.
When we are involved with music we are absorbed into its fine
web of temporal similarities, differences, structures and
processes; its various fields of presence and their inter-
relations. Music is the only art that forms time through sound,
and then so much so that listeners’ intentional time becomes
that of music. In Hegel’s words, music thereby “penetrates the
self, grips it in its simplest being” (Hegel 42: 908). But, this
“gripping,” rather than being inner and individual and
“expressing feelings,” frees us from the fragile limits of the
individual ego, delivering us over to the collective anonymity of
musical style, whilst perhaps also resounding the collective
anonymity of the nonconceptual world.
The truth of music, in the sense of Heidegger’s idea of truth as
revelation, is its coming into presence by standing forth from
mere sound as music; and this together with (though not
necessarily so) its resonance or resounding of a nonconceptual
world. Musical revelation, its glorious passage into
transcendent anonymity as musical presence, can resound
entirely new and unfamiliar ways of being in the nonconceptual
temporality that is peculiar to it. Music dissolves all
distinctions between subject and object, me and them, reason
and feeling, fears and desires, in tears of joy. 
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